Rechtsstaat and Rechtsstaatlichkeit in Germany

Original contribution by Matthias Koetter, Research Associate at the Berlin Social Research Center(WZB) and within the Research Cluster SFB700 on "Governance in Areas of Limited Statehood: New Modes of Governance?" at Freie Universitaet Berlin.

I. The principle of Rechtsstaatlichkeit under the Grundgesetz

Originally, from 1949, the Grundgesetz related to explicitly names the Rechtsstaat only in Art. 28 GG where it regulated that the constitutional order within the Bundesländer whereby the constitutions of the federal states (Bundesländer) have to conform to the principles of the republican, democratic and social Rechtsstaat. A similar homogeneity rule points pointing to the international European level . The 1992 was included in Art. 23 Abs. 1 S. 1 GG regulates that, in order to support the realization of a European Union, the Federal Republic of Germany participates I GG in 1992. Thereby Germany shall participate in the development of the European Union that is verpflichtet to democratic, as long as it is obliged to the rule of law , sozial and the principles of democracy, the social and federal principles state and the principle of subsidiarity and provides Human Rights basic human rights protection equal to this the Grundgesetz. " Since 2000, Art. 16 II 2 of the Grundgesetz GG further allows , on the basis of a law, the extradition of a German citizen citizens to a member state of the European Union or to an international Court as court as long as the principles of the rule of law are preservedis observed.

The Grundgesetz expresses ' concept of the rule of law principles in the rules is composed of various rules and principles on the state architecture and , the structures of constitutional bodies and the Human Rights basic rights guarantees that comprise requirements for the organisation state organization and procedure of the state. Art. 20 GG names comprises several rule of law principles, but however not the German rule of law principle (vgl. BVerfG E 30, 1, 24f.): : the separation of powers in par. 2 the principle of the separation of powers , and in par. 3 the principle of the obligation of the legislation to the constitutional order, constitution and of the executive and the judiciary to the law and justice ("Gesetz und Recht"). The From here the predominance of the constitution and of the law are based here upon and shape the legal order by the a vertical hierarchy of norms. Rechtsstaatlichkeit in the a German understanding also encompasses the unlawfulness of retroactive liabilities, the principle proportionality of proportionality, to dissolve means, the individual dissolution of conflicts between legal certainty and justice individually in hardship cases, and the principle of complete and effective judicial review in cases with relevance to individual freedom and property rights (Art. 19 IV GG; see BVerfG 1968: 21 (E 30, 1, 21)). As a constitutional principle Rechtsstaatlichkeit compasses a multiplicity of principles that are shaped by the Grundgesetz. ). In her book on the principle of Rechtsstaat Katharina Sobota (1997) counts counted not less than 142 (!). Further particular normative meanings of the principle of the rule of law are not sub-)principles on the basis of the Grundgesetz. Besides these, however, no further normative content of the principle is generally approved.

In order to rationalise political rule, Rechtsstaatlichkeit in the German sense shall frame and shape, bind and limitate the state by law (Schulze-Fielitz 2006: Rn. 38). Impressed by Immanuel Kant and Wilhelm von Humboldts, in the beginning of the 19. century scholars The concept of Rechtsstaat goes back to the early 19th century, when German scholars - strongly impressed by the reason-based philosophy of Immanuel Kant - formulated a rule of law program inspired by reason that should institutionalise in order to rationalize political rule and to institutionalize liberal claims against the absolutist -monarchical state-conception conceptions („"gute policey") (see Böckenförde 1969: 144-150; Martini 2009: 308). From a legal practice perspective, Rechtsstaatlichkeit could be narrowed to the principle of regulation by formal law (Gesetzesvorbehalt) for state action relevant for indiviual freedom and property rights, the principle of the law-based administration (Gesetzmäßigkeit der Verwaltung) and a specific administrative judiciary. All three of them  formal requirements which put emphasis to a more formal understanding of the Rechtsstaatlichkeit. Finally, the judicial positivism around 1900 made for the exclusion of substantive and therefore politically contested criteria form the concept of Rechtsstaatlichkeit (see Martini 2009 ibid.). In radical continuation of this understanding, in 1928 Hans Kelsen in his "Reine Rechtslehre" ("Pure Jurisprudence") affirmed the The state should be shaped and framed, bound and limited by the law in three ways: (1) the state administration should be based on law ("Gesetzmäßigkeit der Verwaltung"), (2) regulation by formal law should be required especially for all state action relevant for individual freedom and property rights  ("Gesetzesvorbehalt"), and (3) all administrative actions should be subject to judicial review. All three of these set formal requirements without providing specific substantive normative standards. This lead to an understanding of Rechtsstaatlichkeit as a formal provision. Finally, around 1900, judicial positivism as the leading paradigm in constitutional theory made for the complete exclusion of substantive and, therefore, politically contested criteria from the concept of Rechtsstaatlichkeit (see Böckenförde 1969: 155). In 1928, Hans Kelsen in his "Pure Theory of Law" ("Reine Rechtslehre") radically affirmed the identity of the state and the law. Now, the The state was nothing more than "Rechtsstaat", the legal state. but Rechtsstaat in a formal sense of the term.

Then, after World War II, on the base of the Grundgesetz a rather On the baseis of the Grundgesetz, in Federal Republican Germany a material understanding of Rechtsstaatlichkeit emerged . It which was opposed to the formal legal positivism in the time of the Weimar republic and to the material evolvement of the law during the 3. Reich the Nazi dictatorship (Böckenförde 1992: Sp. 332 ff., 338f.?332-339). The substantive core of the understanding according to the Grundgesetz is the  connecting understanding of the rule of law on the basis of the Grundgesetz in its core connects to a culture of universally valid universal human rights , complemented complemented by a historically grown Understanding understanding of social justice. This Rechtsstaat is to be undertood as an integral Rechtsstaat in this sense must be understood as the complete anti-model to the social and political self-concept of Nationalthe national-socialism. Especially with the legal dogmatics on the principle of proportionality socialist state. Today, the principle of proportionality allows to verify all actions taken by the legislation and by the administration become verifiable administration as regard to substance at the measure of human rights.

II. Obligation to the law and judicial control

This has lead to The German understanding of the rule of law is based on a strict etatist concept of obligation to the law and control:

(1) Für Handlungen der Exekutive bedeutet das, dass es jedenfalls dann, wenn Grundrechte der Bürger berührt werden, eine ausdrücklichen Rechtsgrundlage bedarf, die zugleich die Grenze der Handlungsbefugnis bestimmt. Je größer die Eingriffsintensität ist, desto konkreter muss die Rechtsgrundlage bereits vom Gesetzgeber selbst ausgestaltet sein, um dem Eingriff die erforderliche demokratische Legitimation und rechtsstaatliche Angemessenheit zu verleihen. Bsp. BVerfG zu Eingriffen in das RiS (Rasterfahndung?). Und es gebietet umfassende Kontrollmöglichkeiten (s. u. 3).

(2) Concept and Generation of the Law. Etatistischer Rechtsbegriff und Rechtsordnung als strenger Stufenbau. Wesentliche Regelungen hat der Gesetzgeber selbst zu treffen. Kompetenzverteilung zwischen Bundes- und Landesparlamenten. Untergesetzliche Normen, soweit ausdrücklich zugelassen (VOen, Satzungen). Ausblendung nicht-rechtlicher Normen als Rechtmäßigkeitsmaßstab. Vielmehr Akzeptanz nur im Rahmen der geschriebenen Rechtsordnung, soweit keine Kollisionen. Nur ausnahmsweise staatliche Anerkennung anderer Normensystem bspw. im rahmen von Art. 4 oder beim Expertenrecht oder im Rahmen der privatautonomen Vertragsgestaltung.

(3) For the German understanding of Rechtsstaatlichkeita high judicial gerichtliche Kontrolldichte is specific. Kontrolle der öffentlichen Gewalt by an independant judiciary, gewährleistet durch die Unabhängigkeit des einzelnen Richters (Art. 97 GG), verschiedene Rechtswege und Instanzenzüge zur gerichtlichen Selbstkontrolle. Prozessrecht als selbständige Rechtsmaterie. Grundrechtliche Absicherung des effektiven Rechtsschutzes bei öff. Gewalt in Art. 19 IVGG und Prozessgrundrechte in Art. 101 ff. GG. Allerdings erfordert die im Rahmen von 19 IV und dem Justizgewährleistungsanspruchs geforderte Rechtskontrolle nicht zwingend die gerichtliche Kontrolle, wie die anerkannte Ausnahme bei der Kontrolle von Geheimdiensthandeln zeigt, wo eine parlamentarische Kontrolle die gerichtliche ersetzt (BVerfgE 30, 1, 21 ff.). Und im Rahmen der privatautonomen Bestimmung von Rechtsschutz- und Schiedsstellen.

, i.e. all legal norms have to reference the state. All relevant regulations have to be pre-formulated by legislation, whereby the competences of the federal parliament and the provincial legislative bodies have to be observed. Non-legislative regulations − like by-laws and decrees − need a statutory source of legitimacy and have to fit into the legal order. Social norms like religious or expert laws and technical standards may exist besides statute as long as they do not cause collisions. They may even be ensured, for example, by the freedom of religion (Art. 4 GG) or within the private autonomy guarantee. As a standard of legality, however, they can only be drawn on as far as they are approved by the statutory legal order or by jurisdiction.

The principles of the supremacy of statutory law and the pre-formulation of state-actions by legislation ("Vorrang und Vorbehalt des Gesetzes") both express a comprehensive concept of the obligation to the law and judicial control. Executive actions, therefore, are strictly bound to the law. Explicit statutory competences are required whenever individual human rights are affected by state action. The statutory competence not only approves the act, but also restricts it to the legally approved. The more intense the state action affects human rights, the more specifically the competence has to be formulated by legislation in order to provide the necessary democratic legitimacy and - from a rule of law point of view - satisfy the demands of proportionality (E. g. for competences in the case of privacy relevant security measures see German Constitutional Court, decisions of 2004/3/4 "Acoustic surveillance of private living space" and 2008/3/11 "License plate scan").

Accompanying the obligation of executive actions to the law, Rechtsstaatlichkeit requires close judicial review with a strict standard of review (Art. 20 III GG). In the Grundgesetz it is ensured by a complex system of different recourses to the courts and stages of appeal for judicial self-control and by the independency of the judges (Art. 92, 95, 97 GG). Procedural law is approved as a self-consistent legal matter with specific dogmatics. Art. 19 IV GG guarantees access to judicial review in cases of state action against individual basic rights. Only exceptionally, judicial review may not be compulsorily exercised by courts but by adequate control instances. E. g. for the control of intelligence a confident parliamentary control is approved  (see German Constitutional Court, decision of 1970/12/15 "Telephone surveillance for intelligence purposes"). And within the range of individual autonomous choice of action non-state arbitration bodies may serve for judicial review purposes instead of courts. In cases of criminal court procedure, constitutional rights guarantee fair trial principles (Art. 101-103 GG).

The legislative and its obligation to the constitution (Art. 20 III GG) and especially to the basic human rights is controlled by the Federal Constitutional Court ("Bundesverfassungsgericht", Art. 92-93 GG). The instrument of individual constitutional complaint ("Verfassungsbeschwerde", Die Kontrolle des Gesetzgebers erfolgt durch die Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit. Die Bindung an die Verfassung (Art. 20 Abs. 3 GG) und vor allem an die Grundrechte wird vom Bundesver­fassungsgerichts (Art. 92 ff. GG) kontrolliert. Nicht zuletzt das Institut der Verfassungsbeschwerde ( Art. 93 Abs. 1 Nr. 4a GG) verleiht dieser Kontrolle Dynamik, seine Gesetzesverwerfungskompetenz (§ 31 BVerfGG) verleiht ihr Durchsetzungskraft. Die Durchsetzung des umfassenden Verfassungsvorrangs ist als „Konstitutionalisierung der Rechtsordnung" rekonstruiert worden (Schuppert/ Bumke 2000). Die Verfassungsbindung des Parlaments und die starke Stellung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts sind keinesfalls unumstritten, führen sie doch letztlich zu einem Übergewicht des Rechtsstaats gegenüber der Demokratie. Das Rechtsstaatsprinzip beschränkt den Handlungsspielraum des Staates und auch des Parlaments (Martini 2009: ...).keeps this control in dynamic, the Courts competence to dismiss statutory law provides the necessary force for effectiveness. Accordingly, over a period of sixty years since the enactment of the Grundgesetz, the German legal order has been smoothly but comprehensively "constitutionalized" (see Schuppert / Bumke 2000).

III. Rechtsstaatlichkeit and the democratic principle

The obligation of parliamentary decisions to the constitution and the strong position of the constitutional court within the constitutional setting of the Grundgesetz are far from being unchallenged as they may lead to an unbalance between the principle of democracy and the rule of law in favor of the latter. Rechtsstaatlichkeit limits - and shall limit! - the range of legitimate state action, including the parliament's range of decision. Democracy in the German understanding is disciplined by the rule of law in multiple relations: (1) According to the Grundgesetz all democratic state actions have to originate from the people (Art. 20 II GG). In a common sense, the rule is interpreted as the requirement of specific competence laws and the exercise of state action by a personnel whose legitimacy originates from the parliament. In this sense, democratic concers are turned into structural requirements and, thus, into rule of law issues. (2) On the base of individual human rights guarantees the ground and the limits of individual freedoms become an issue of constitutional law to be enforced with the help of the courts. The matter is withdrawn from democratic deliberation and transferred to the courts for ensuring lawfulness and proportionality in a legal sense. (3) Due to its far reaching competences - compared on an international scale - the German Constitutional Court can put an end to political and social debates in an ex cathedra manner by adding the "constitutional full-stop"; however, often enough it succeeds in re-integrating the opponent political partys. (4) Under the term "fortified democracy" ("wehrhafte Demokratie"), a number of legal instruments are approved - like the prohibition of political parties (Art. 21 II GG) or the loss of basic rights (Art. 18 GG), both to be stated by the Constitutional Court -, that allow to interrupt the democratic discourse for the purpose of ensuring the liberal democratic fundamental order of the state.

The limits to democratic deliberation and procedures based on rules and principles can be considered the main argument against an understanding of the rule of law with rich substantive content beyond the requirements of formal legality. And even the short history of the Grundgesetz has shown waves of the materialization and the re-formalization of the rule of law concept (Grimm 1980: 704.)Das demokratische Prinzip ist gleich in mehrfacher Hinsicht rechtsstaatlich diszipliniert: 1) Die sich aus dem Demokratieprinzip ergebenden Anforderungen (Art. 20 II GG) werden über einen formalen Begriff demokratischer Legitimation verfassungsrechtlich gewendet und so zu einem Thema der Rule of law. 2) Über die Grundrechtsgarantien des GG werden individuelle Freiheiten zu Rechtspositionen mit Verfassungsrang und gerichtlich durchsetzbar und damit zur Frage der nicht auf demokratischem Wege hintergehbaren Recht- und Verfassungsmäßigkeit (insbes. Verhältnismäßigkeit), 3) Aufgrund seiner im internationalen Vergleich weitreichenden Kompetenzen (Brodocz 2003: 255f.) kann das Bundesverfassungsgericht gesellschaftlichen Auseinandersetzungen nicht selten den verfassungsrechtlichen Schlusspunkt hinzufügen und die demokratische Debatten ex cathedra beenden und die politischen Lagern dabei gleichwohl integrieren. 4) Wehrhafte oder streitbare Demokratie im Sinne von staatlichen Instrumenten zur Unterbrechung des Diskurses und zum Erhalt der freiheitlichen demokratischen Grundordnung (Art. 79 Abs. 3 GG, 33 V, 9 II, 21 II, 18 GG.).

IV. Formal or substantive conceptions of Rechtsstaatlichkeit?

Offen ist die Frage, inwieweit das deutsche Verständnis der Rule of Law über die formalen Anforderungen einer rechtlichen Bindung und der Rechtskontrolle hinaus noch weitere materielle Elemente umfasst, There is agreement that Rechtsstaatlichkeit means at least formal legality, i.e. thicker or thinner conception of the rule of law. Die Beantwortung dieser Frage hängt mit der Verwendung des Begriffs im Zusammenspiel mit anderen Strukturprinzipien der Verfassungsstaatlichkeit zusammen, insbesondere der Garantie der menschenrechte und dem Demokratieprinzip. Reduziert man diese Prinzipien alle auf ihren Bedeutungskern, um Überschneidungen zu vermeiden, dann zählt zur formellen Seite des Rechtsstaats zählen die Rechtstechnik staatlichen Handelns (das Wie) - also Gesetzmäßigkeit, Staatsstruktur­anforderungen, Rechtsschutz­ressourcen und Staatshaf­tung, während die das staatliche Handeln anleitenden Rechtsinhalte (das Was) anderweitig verortet sind (Schmidt-Aßmann, Rn 18f.; Martini 2009: ...). Verwendet man den Rechtsstaatsbegriff dagegen gehaltvoller, ohne Form und Inhalt voneinander zu trennen, dann ist über den Ausgleich gegenläufiger Freiheitsinteressen hinaus auch die Gewährleistung der Verhältnisse und der Wertordnung von ihm umfasst, die die Voraussetzungen für die Verwirklichung des Rechts und insbesondere die Inanspruchnahme der Grundrechte sind (vgl. Kunig 2001: 434). Allerdings ist der normative Gehalt des Rechtsstaatsprinzips als Verfassungsprinzip, wie es als Maßstab der Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit dient, auf die ausdrücklichen Gehalte des Grundgesetzes reduziert. Einerseits wird die Frage nach den Inhalten dadurch zu einer verfassungspolitischen, andererseits gehen dadurch auch bei einem formellen Verständnis des Rechtsstaatsprinzips keine Inhalte verloren, soweit die anderweitig in der Verfassung oder in der einfachen Rechtsordnung verbrieft sind. Aus diesem Grunde ist parallel zur Ausdifferenzierung der Wertordnung des Grundgesetzes durch die Gerichte in der einfachen Rechtsordnung von einer Reformalisierung des Rechtsstaatsbegriffs gesprochen worden, weil dieser zunehmend wieder auf die Anerkennung der Positivität des gesetzten Rechts beschränkt worden ist (Grimm 1980: 704.).

V. Conditions of Rechtsstaatlichkeit

obligation to the law and judicial review. However, in how far it relates to additional - substantive - requirements like democracy, individual rights and social welfare is a very disputed question. And both of these variants we can find in "thinner" and "thicker" versions (Tamanaha 2004: 91).

In order to be able to take position in this controversy the meaning of Rechtsstaatlichkeit in relation to other structural principles of constitutionality has to be taken into account, especially in relation to the principle of democracy and to the constitutional guarantee of basic human rights. If the constitutional demands are all reduced to their normative core in order to avoid overlaps, a formal variant of the rule of law will cover the more technical aspects to legal state actions ("how to rule?") which comprises the obligation to formal statute law, structures of state organization and judicial review and the liability of public authorities to pay compensation. The political substance that gives direction to state actions ("rule to which aim?") will be excluded from such a "thinner" conception. A substantive variant, however, will not separate formal and material elements, but, instead, emphasize their interdependence. Beyond the harmonization of contradicting freedom interests, it would also include the ensuring of the normative preconditions that the realization of the rule of law and especially the formulation of individual human rights claims are based on (Kunig 2001: 434).

Today, the normative substance of Rechtsstaatlichkeit - as a constitutional principle and a legal standard for the constitutional courts - is predominantly reduced to the rules explicitly mentioned in the Grundgesetz. Thus, further substantive elements of the rule of law turn into political claims while, on the other hand, from the perspective of a formal understanding of the rule of law no substantive content has to be renounced as far as it is regulated elsewhere. Parallel to the unfolding of the constitutional order of the Grundgesetz within the German legal order by the courts, the meaning of the rule of law as a self-contained constitutional principle has more and more been reduced to the approval of the positivity of the statutory laws that conform with all of the provisions of the Grundgesetz.

V. Preconditions of Rechtsstaatlichkeit

Thus, terminologically, Rechtsstaatlichkeit according to the Grundgesetz can be differed from individual human rights and from the principle of democratic ruleTerminologically, the principle of Rechtsstaatlichkeit, according to the German Grundgesetz, can be differed from human rights guarantee and from the democratic principle. However, the parallel historical development of these conceptions conceps will always determine each others meanings, and they can only unfold completely embedded in a context that encompasses the whole canon. Even if the liberal and secular state may feed upon preconditions that it could not guarantee by itself, as Böckenförde (1969) pointed outcannot guarantee itself (Böckenförde), it may intend to preserve its the moral, social and political grounds of democracy and Rechtsstaatlichkeit by adequate institutional and legal structures. In order to preserve the social preconditions of Rechtsstaatlichkeitthis regard, the Grundgesetz not only contains the principle of the social welfare state as a binding constitutional objective (Art. 20 I GG), but it also allows public school supervision (Art. 7 GG), it ensures free information by broadcast and press (Art. 5 I GG), and it protects religiously guided conveying of values and meaning in an individual and a collective dimension (Art. 4 GG). Rechtsstaatlichkeit in the sense of a German understanding of the rule of law will always be bound to the context of the democratic and social constitutional state.

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Eberhard Schmidt-Aßmann (...): § 26 Rechtsstaat, in: Handbuch des Staatsrechts ...

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Image Added 1990, Sp. 367 ff.